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Abstract
Lindstro¨m’s Theorem characterizes first order logic as the maximal
logic satisfying the Compactness Theorem and the Downward Lo¨wen-
heim-Skolem Theorem. If we do not assume that logics are closed un-
der negation, there is an obvious extension of first order logic with the
two model theoretic properties mentioned, namely existential second
order logic. We show that existential second order logic has a whole
family of proper extensions satisfying the Compactness Theorem and
the Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem. Furthermore, we show
that in the context of negation-less logics, positive logics, as we call
them, there is no strongest extension of first order logic with the Com-
pactness Theorem and the Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem.
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1 Introduction
Our motivating question in this paper is whether we can generalize Lind-
stro¨m’s Theorem from first order logic to Σ11, that is, existential second order
logic. In the case of first order logic Lindstro¨m’s Theorem says that first order
logic is maximal with the Compactness Theorem1 and the Downward Lo¨wen-
heim-Skolem Theorem2 among logics satisfying some minimal closure condi-
tions [7]. One of the assumed closure conditions is closure under negation.
What happens if we drop this assumption? It seems that this question was
first explicitly raised in [4]. The Compactness Theorem and the Downward
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem make perfect sense, whether we have negation
or not. These two conditions make no reference to negation.
In earlier related work ([11]) we showed that a strong form of Lindstro¨m’s
Theorem fails for extensions of Lκω and Lκκ: For weakly compact κ there is
no strongest extension of Lκω with the (κ, κ)-compactness property and the
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem down to κ. With an additional set-theoretic as-
sumption, there is no strongest extension of Lκκ with the (κ, κ)-Compactness
Theorem and the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem down to < κ.
Obviously first order logic itself is not maximal if negation is dropped
because existential second order logic Σ11, and even Σ
1
1,δ (also denoted PC∆),
i.e. existential second order quantifiers followed by a countable conjunction
of first order sentences, which clearly satisfy both the Compactness Theorem
and the Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem, also properly extend first
order logic.
We are led to the following (interrelated) questions, all in the context of
logics where closure under negation is not assumed:
Question 1: Is Σ11 (or rather Σ
1
1,δ) maximal among logics satisfying the
Compactness Theorem and the Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem?
Question 2: Is there an extension of Σ11 (or Σ
1
1,δ) which is maximal among
logics satisfying the Compactness Theorem and the Downward Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem Theorem?
1The (κ, λ)-Compactness Theorem says: Every theory of size ≤ κ, every subset of size
< λ of which has a model, has a model. Compactness Theorem means (ω, ω)-Compactness
Theorem.
2The Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem down to κ says: Every sentence in a
countable vocabulary, which has a model of size ≤ κ. “Down to < κ” means “has a model
of size < κ”. The Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem means the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem
Theorem down to ℵ0.
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Question 3: Is there a characterization of Σ11 (or Σ
1
1,δ) as maximal among
logics satisfying some model-theoretic conditions?
Question 4: Is there an extension of Σ11 (or Σ
1
1,δ) which is maximal (or even
strongest) among logics satisfying some model-theoretic conditions?
In this paper we formulate Questions 1 and 2 in exact terms. We answer
Question 1 negatively. As to Question 2 we show that there is no strongest3
extension of Σ11 satisfying the Compactness Theorem and the Downward
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem. The existence of a maximal one (which has no
proper such extension) remains open. Questions 3 and 4 remain completely
unanswered. Admittedly, Question 4 is a little vague as both “extension”
and “model-theoretical conditions” are left open.
To answer the above Questions 1 and 2 we introduce a family of new
generalized quantifiers associated with the very natural and intuitive concept
of the density of a set of reals. These quantifiers are defined for the purpose
of solving the said questions and may lack wider relevance, although the
general study of logics without negation is so undeveloped that it may be
too early to say what is relevant and what is not.
Notation: We use M and N to denote structures, and M and N to denote
their universes, respectively. For finite sequences s and sets a, we use sˆ〈a〉
to denote the extension of s by the element a. For sequences of length ≤ ω,
s⊳ s′ means that s is an initial segment of s′. The empty sequence is denoted
∅. A subset A of 2ω is said to be dense if for all s ∈ 2<ω there is s′ ∈ A such
that s ⊳ s′.
2 Positive logics
We define the concept of a positive logic, meaning a logic without negation,
except in front of atomic (and first order) formulas. We have to be careful
about substitution in this context. If we are too lax about the substitution4
of formulas into atomic formulas we end up having a logic which is closed
3By strongest extension we mean one which contains every other as a sublogic.
4The Substitution Property says that if φ is in an abstract logic L∗, P is an n-ary
predicate symbol in the vocabulary of φ and ψ(x1, . . . , xn) is a formula of L
∗, then the
result of substituting ψ(t1, . . . , tn) to occurrences of P (t1, . . . , tn) in φ is again in L
∗. For
details, see [3, Def. 1.2.3].
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under negation, which is not what we want. Substitution is very natural, but
it is not needed in Lindstro¨m’s characterization of first order logic.
One may ask whether a logic deserves to be called a logic if it is not closed
under negation? We do not try to answer this question, but merely point
out that there are several logics that do not have a negation in the sense
that we have in mind, i.e. in the sense of classical logic. Take, for example,
constructive logic. Although it has a negation, it does not have the Law of
Excluded Middle, so its negation does not function in the way we mean when
we ask whether a logic is closed under negation. In our sense constructive
logic is not closed under negation. Another example is continuous logic [?]
and the related positive logic of [1]. We have already mentioned existential
second order logic Σ11 and its stronger form, Σ
1
1,δ. In the same category as Σ
1
1
are Dependence logic [12] and Independence Friendly Logic [8]. Transfinite
game quantifiers yield infinitary logics which are not closed under negation,
due to non-determinacy [5]. In the finite context there is the complexity
class non-deterministic polynomial time NP, which is equivalent to existential
second order logic on finite models, of which it is not known whether it is
closed under negation. In this paper we introduce new examples of logics
without negation.
Definition 1 A positive logic is an abstract logic5 in the sense of [7] (see
also [3]) which contains first order logic and is closed under disjunction,
conjunction, and first order quantifiers ∃ and ∀. We do not require closure
under negation, nor closure under substitution.
Example 2 1. First order logic is a positive logic.
2. Σ11 and Σ
1
1,δ are positive logics.
3. If L is a positive logic, then so is Σ11(L), the closure of L under exis-
tential second order quantification.
5An abstract logic (or “a generalized first order logic”), in the sense of [7] is a pair
L = (Σ, T ), where Σ is an arbitrary set and T is a binary relation between members of Σ
on the one hand and structures on the other. Members of Σ are called L-sentences. Classes
of the form {M : T (φ,M)}, where φ is an L-sentence, are called L-characterizable classes.
Abstract logics are assumed to satisfy five axioms expressed in terms of L-characterizable
classes. The axioms correspond to being closed under isomorphism, conjunction, negation,
permutation of symbols, and “free” expansions.
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3 A class of new quantifiers
In the tradition of [6] we define our new generalized quantifiers by first spec-
ifying a class of structures, closed under isomorphisms.
Let τd be the vocabulary {R0, R1, R2, R3, R4} consisting of binary predi-
cates R0, R1, R2 and unary predicates R3, R4.
Example 3 A canonical example of a τd-structure is the model
MA = (M,R
MA
0 , R
MA
1 , R
MA
2 , R
MA
3 , R
MA
4 ),
where A ⊆ 2ω and
• M = 2<ω ∪A.
• RMAi = {(a, b) ∈ (2
<ω)2 : b = aˆ〈i〉} (i = 0, 1).
• RMA2 = {(a, b) ∈M ×M : a ⊳ b}.
• RMA3 = {∅}.
• RMA4 =M.
Definition 4 For n < ω and η ∈ 2n we define ψη(x) as:
R4(x) ∧ ∃y0 . . .∃yn (R3(y0) ∧
∧
i≤nR4(yn) ∧
∧
i<n yiRη(i)yi+1 ∧
∧
i≤n yiR2x).
For a τd-model M and a ∈M we define
Ω(M, a) = {η ∈ 2<ω :M |= ψη(a)}
Ω(M) = {η ∈ 2ω : for some a ∈M , η ↾ n ∈ Ω(M, a) for all n < ω}.
If η ∈ Ω(M, a), we say that a represents η in M. We also say that M
represents the set Ω(M).
One element a can represent several η, but later in Section 7 we impose
a further restriction to the effect that representation is unique.
Note that ifM is a τd-model, then the property “Ω(M) is dense” is a Σ
1
1-
property ofM. Since we aim at a logic which goes beyond existential second
order logic, we have to sharpen the requirement of density. The property of
τd-models we are interested in is the property that “Ω(M) \ A is dense” for
some preassigned set A ⊆ 2ω of reals.
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Definition 5 Let A ⊆ 2ω. We define the Lindstro¨m quantifier QA as fol-
lows. Suppose M is a model and c¯ ∈Mk. Then we define
(QAx0x1)(ψ0(x0, x1, c¯), ψ1(x0, x1, c¯), ψ2(x0, x1, c¯), ψ3(x0, c¯), ψ4(x0, c¯)) (1)
to be true in M if and only if Ω(Mψ¯) \ A is dense, where
ψ¯ = (ψ0(x0, x1, c¯), ψ1(x0, x1, c¯), ψ2(x0, x1, c¯), ψ3(x0, c¯), ψ4(x0, c¯)),
Mψ¯ = (M,R
N
0 , R
N
1 , R
N
2 , R
N
3 , R
N
4 ),
and
• RNi = {(a, b) ∈ M
2 :M |= ψi(a, b, c¯)} (i = 0, 1, 2).
• RN3 = {a ∈ M :M |= ψ3(a, c¯)}.
• RN4 = {a ∈ M :M |= ψ4(a, c¯)}.
Definition 6 Suppose A ⊆ 2ω. We define the positive logic LdA as the clo-
sure of first order logic under conjunction, disjunction, first order quantifiers
∃ and ∀, the existential second order quantifier ∃R, where R is a relation
symbol, and the generalized quantifier QA. We denote by L
d,ω
A the extension
of LdA obtained by allowing countable conjunctions as a logical operation. Fi-
nally, the proper class Ld,∞A denotes the extension of L
d
A obtained by allowing
arbitrary set-size conjunctions as a logical operation.
With the obvious definition of what it means for a positive logic to be a
sublogic of another, we can immediately observe that Σ11 is a sublogic of L
d
A,
and Σ11,δ is a sublogic of L
d,ω
A whatever A is.
Example 7 Suppose A ⊆ 2ω. The class KA of τd-models M satisfying
“Ω(M) \ A is dense” is (trivially) definable in LdA, as M ∈ KA if and
only if M |= ψA, where
ψA = (QAx0x1)(R0(x0, x1), R1(x0, x1), R2(x0, x1), R3(x0), R4(x0)).
The model MB of Example 3 is in KA, if and only if B \ A is dense.
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For future reference we make the following observation: If η ∈ 2n, y¯ =
(y0, . . . , yn−1), ψ¯ as in Definition 5 is a 5-tuple of formulas of L
d
A, and
Γn,k
ψ¯,η
(y¯, x, z¯) ∈ LdA is the conjunction of
ψ4(yn, z¯) for i ≤ n
ψ4(x, z¯) ∧ ψ3(y0, z¯)
ψη(i)(yi, yi+1, z¯) for i < n
ψ2(yi, x, z¯) for i ≤ n,
then (1) is equivalent to
For every σ ∈ 2<ω there are η ∈ 2ω \ A extending σ
and a ∈M such that for some function n 7→ 〈bn0 , . . . , b
n
n−1〉
from ω to Mn we have M |= Γn,k
ψ¯,η↾n
(bn0 , . . . , b
n
n−1, a, c¯) for all n < ω.
(2)
We proceed to proving that the logic LdA, for suitably chosen A ⊆ 2
ω,
satisfies the Compactness Theorem and the Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem
Theorem, and also properly extends Σ11.
4 The Compactness Theorem
We use the well-established method of ultraproducts to prove the Compact-
ness Theorem of LdA.
Theorem 8 ( Los´ Lemma for LdA) Suppose 2
ω \ A is dense. Suppose Mi,
i ∈ I, are models and D is an ultrafilter on a set I. Let M =
∏
i∈IMi/D,
f0, . . . , fn−1 ∈
∏
i∈I Mi and φ(x0, . . . , xn−1) in L
d
A (or even in L
d,∞
A ). Then
{i ∈ I :Mi |= φ(f0(i), . . . , fn−1(i))} ∈ D ⇒M |= φ(f0/D, . . . , fn−1/D).
Proof: We use induction on φ. The cases corresponding to the atomic
formulas, the negated atomic fromulas, conjunction (even infinite conjunc-
tion), disjunction, ∃, ∀, and ∃R (see e.g. [2, 4.1.14]) are all standard and
well-known. In the case of disjunction we use the property of ultrafilters that
I1∪ I2 ∈ D implies I1 ∈ D or I2 ∈ D. We are left with the induction step for
QA. Let us denote f0(i), . . . , fn−1(i) by f¯(i) and f0/D, . . . , fn−1/D by f¯ /D.
We assume
J = {u ∈ I :Mi |= (QAx0x1)(ψ0(x0, x1, f¯(i)), . . . , ψ4(x0, f¯(i)))} ∈ D (3)
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and demonstrate M |= (QAx0x1)(ψ0(x0, x1, f¯/D), . . . , ψ4(x0, f¯/D)). For
i ∈ J the set Bi of elements η of 2ω \ A such that there are ai ∈ Mi
and bn0,i . . . , b
n
n−1,i in Mi such that Mi |= Γ
n,k
ψ¯,η↾n
(bn0,i, . . . , b
n
n−1,i, ai, f¯(i)) for
all n < ω, is dense.
Case 1: D is ℵ1-incomplete. Let J = I0 ⊇ I1 ⊇ . . . be a descending
chain in D with empty intersection. We show that the set B of η ∈ 2ω such
that there is a ∈ M such that for some bn0 , . . . , b
n
n−1 in
∏
iMi/D we have
M |= Γn,k
ψ¯,η↾n
(bn0 , . . . , b
n
n−1, a, f¯/D) for all n < ω, is the full set 2
ω. Since we
assume that 2ω \ A is dense, it follows that B \ A is dense, as we claim.
Suppose η ∈ 2ω is arbitrary. Let i ∈ In+1 \ In. Because Bi is dense, there
are, for all n < ω, extensions ηi ∈ 2ω of η ↾ n and elements ai, bni,0, . . . , b
n
i,n−1 ∈
Mi such that
Mi |= Γ
n,k
ψ¯,ηi↾n
(bni,0, . . . , b
n
i,n−1, ai, f¯(i)) (4)
for all n < ω. Let h(i) = ai. For i ∈ In \ In+1 and m < n, let gnm(i) = b
n
i,m.
Now
{i ∈ I :Mi |= Γ
n,k
ψ¯,η↾n
(gn0 (i), . . . , g
n
n−1(i), h(i), f¯(i))} ⊇ In+1 ∈ D.
Hence
M |= Γn,k
ψ¯,η↾n
(gn0 /D, . . . , g
n
n−1/D, h/D, f¯/D).
Case 2: D is ℵ1-complete. We show that the set B of η ∈ 2ω \A such that
for some a, bn0 , . . . , b
n
n−1 ∈M we haveM |= Γ
n,k
ψ¯,η↾n
(bn0 , . . . , b
n
n−1, a, f¯/D) for all
n < ω, is dense. Suppose η ∈ 2n. By the density of Bi, for each i ∈ J there
is νi ∈ Bi extending η. There is J0 ⊆ J in D such that νi(n) is constant for
i ∈ J0. There is J1 ⊆ J0 in D such that νi(n+ 1) is constant for i ∈ J1, etc.
By ℵ1-completeness we get J∞ ∈ D such that νi(m) is constant, say η∗(m)
for all m ≥ n and all i ∈ J∞. Now η∗ ∈ B follows easily. ✷
Corollary 9 If 2ω \ A is dense, then:
1. LdA (even L
d,∞
A ) satisfies the (full) Compactness Theorem.
2. Every sentence of LdA with an infinite model has arbitrarily large models.
3. The only sentences in LdA that have a negation (in the usual sense) are
the first order (equivalent) ones.
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Proof: The usual argument gives 1: Suppose T is a finitely consistent
theory in LdA. Let I be the set of finite subsets of T and for each i ∈
I, let Mi |= i. If φ ∈ T , let Aφ = {i ∈ I : φ ∈ i}. Then the family
J = {Aφ : φ ∈ T} has the finite intersection property. Let D be a non-
principal ultrafilter on I extending J . Now if φ ∈ T , then
∏
DMi |= φ, as
{i ∈ I :Mi |= φ} ⊇ Aφ ∈ D.
Claim 2 follows immediately from Claim from 1. Claim 3 follows from the
ultraproduct characterization of first order model classes (see e.g. [2, 4.1.12])
and the characterization of elementary equivalence in terms of ultrapowers
[10]. ✷
Theorem 10 (Robinson’s Consistency Lemma for LdA) Suppose 2
ω\A
is dense. Suppose T1 and T2 are consistent L
d
A-theories with vocabularies τ1
and τ2, respectively, such that T1 ∩ T2 is complete with respect to first order
logic in the vocabulary τ1 ∩ τ2. Then T1 ∪ T2 is consistent.
Proof: This proof is not specific to LdA, but is rather a well-known con-
sequence of  Los´ Lemma, Theorem 8. Let M1 |= T1 and M2 |= T2. Let M
−
l
be the reduct of Ml to the vocabulary τd = τ1 ∩ τ2. Now M
−
1 and M
−
2 are
elementarily equivalent in first order logic, for if M−1 |= φ then necessarily
T1 ∩ T2 |= φ, whence M
−
2 |= φ, and vice versa. By [10] there are a set I and
an ultrafilter D on I such that if we denoteMI1/D by N1 andM
I
2/D by N2,
then N1 ↾ τd ∼= N2 ↾ τd. W.l.o.g. N1 ↾ τd = N2 ↾ τd. Let N be a common
expansion of N1 and N2. By Theorem 8, N ↾ τ1 |= T1 and N ↾ τ2 |= T2.
Hence, N |= T1 ∪ T2. ✷
5 The Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem prop-
erty
The Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Property, which says that any sentence
(of the logic) which has a model has a countable model, is an important
ingredient of the Lindstro¨m characterization of first order logic. The main
examples of logics with this property, apart from first order logic, are Lω1ω
and its sublogics L(Q0) and the weak second order logic L
2
w. We now prove
this property for LdA in a particularly strong form.
Because of lack of negation the elementary submodel relation M 4 N
splits into two different concepts M 4+ N and M 4− N :
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Definition 11 Let us write N 4−
LdA
M if N ⊆ M and for all a1, . . . , an in
N and all formulas φ(x1, . . . , xn) of L
d
A we have
M |= φ(a1, . . . , an)⇒ N |= φ(a1, . . . , an).
Respectively, we write N 4+
LdA
M if N ⊆M and for all a1, . . . , an in N and
all formulas φ(x1, . . . , xn) of L
d
A we have
N |= φ(a1, . . . , an)⇒M |= φ(a1, . . . , an).
Similarly for Ld,ωA and L
d,∞
A , and for fragments (i.e. subsets closed under
subformulas) Γ thereof.
The Compactness Theorem implies that every infinite model N has ar-
bitrarily large M such that N 4+
LdA
M (Corollary 9).
Theorem 12 (Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem) Sup-
pose κ ≥ ℵ0, A ⊆ 2ω, M is a model for a vocabulary of cardinality ≤ κ, and
X ⊆ M such that |X| ≤ κ. Then there is N 4−
LdA
M (even N 4−Γ M for
any fixed fragment of Ld,∞A of size ≤ κ) such that X ⊆ N and |N | = κ.
Proof: We first expand M as follows: For every LdA-formula φ(R, z¯),
where R is n-ary and z¯ = z0, . . . , zk−1, we make sure there is a predicate sym-
bol R∗ of arity k + n such that if M |= ∃Rφ(R, c¯), then M |= φ(R∗(c¯, ·), c¯).
Likewise, we may assume the vocabulary of M has a Skolem function fφ
for each formula φ(x, z¯) such that if M |= ∃xφ(x, c¯), then M |= φ(fφ(c¯), c¯).
Let τ be the original vocabulary of M and τ ∗ the vocabulary of the ex-
pansion, which we also denote M. For any formulas ψ¯ in LdA of the vocab-
ulary τ ∗ and c¯ ∈ Mk such that (1) above holds, let g(n, k, ψ¯, η, c¯) be the
function which maps n, k, ψ¯, c¯ and η ∈ 2n to 〈bn0 , . . . , b
n
n−1〉 ∈ M
n such that
M |= Γn,k
ψ¯,η↾n
(bn0 , . . . , b
n
n−1, a, c¯) for all n < ω. LetK ≺ Hθ, where θ ≥ (κ+2
ω)+
such that M ⊆ Hθ, |K| = κ and {A, κ, τ,M, X, g} ∪ κ ∪ τ ∗ ∪X ⊆ K. Let
N be the restriction of M to K, i.e. the universe N of N is M ∩K and the
constants, relations and functions of M are relativized to N .
We need to check that N is closed under the interpretations of function
symbols of the vocabulary of M. Let f be such a function symbol. Suppose
f is n-ary and c¯ ∈ Nn. The sentence ∃x(x ∈ M ∧ x = fM(c¯)) is true in Hθ,
hence true in K. Thus there is b ∈ N(= M ∩K) such that b = fM(c¯) is true
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in K. Therefore fM(c¯) = b ∈ N . We can conclude that N is a substructure
of M.
Claim: If φ(~x) is a τ -formula in LdA, then M |= φ(~a)⇒ N |= φ(~a).
We use induction on φ. The claim follows from N ⊆ M for atomic and
negated atomic φ. The claim is clearly preserved under conjunction and
disjunction. It is also trivially preserved under universal quantifier, since
N ⊆ M. The induction steps for both first and second order existential
quantifiers are trivial because of the expansion we have performed on M.
We are left with the quantifier QA.
Suppose M satisfies (1) with c¯ ∈ Nk. Thus (2) holds and we want to
prove (2) with M replaced by N . Note that (2) also holds in K. Suppose
σ ∈ 2n is given. There is η ∈ K ∩ (2ω \A) extending σ such that K satisfies
There is a ∈M such that for some function n 7→ 〈bn0 , . . . , b
n
n−1〉
from ω to Mn we have M |= Γn,k
ψ¯,η↾n
(bn0 , . . . , b
n
n−1, a, c¯) for all n < ω.
Thus there are a ∈ N and a function n 7→ 〈bn0 , . . . , b
n
n−1〉 from ω to N
n
such that M |= Γn,k
ψ¯,η↾n
(bn0 , . . . , b
n
n−1, a, c¯) for all n < ω. By the Induction
Hypothesis, N |= Γn,k
ψ¯,η↾n
(bn0 , . . . , b
n
n−1, a, c¯) for all n < ω follows. ✷
We conclude that every sentence of LdA which has a model has a countable
model and an uncountable model.
The following examples show that Theorem 12 is in a sense optimal:
Example 13 There is an uncountable model M, namely (P(ω)∪{ω}, ω,∈),
such that there is no countable model N with N 4+
Σ1
1
M. There is a countable
model N , namely (ω,<), such that there is no uncountable model M with
N 4−
Σ1
1
M.
6 Proper extensions of Σ11 and Σ
1
1,δ
Our goal in this section is to show that for many A ⊆ 2ω the logic LdA properly
extends Σ11 and L
d,ω
A properly extends Σ
1
1,δ. We have a spectrum of results to
this effect but nothing as conclusive as being able to explicitly point out such
a set A. There are obvious reasons for this. The logic Σ11 is very powerful and
any “simple” A ⊆ 2ω is likely to yield LdA which is equivalent to Σ
1
1 rather
than properly extending it. This is even more true with Ld,ωA and Σ
1
1,δ.
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We first establish the basic existence of sets A ⊂ 2ω with the desired
properties. We shall then refine the result with further arguments.
Theorem 14 There are sets A ⊆ 2ω such that 2ω \ A is dense and QA is
not definable in Σ11, nor in Σ
1
1,δ, nor in Lω1ω1.
Proof: Let Aα, α < 2
ω, be disjoint dense subsets of 2ω. For any X ⊆ 2ω,
let
AX =
⋃
α∈X
Aα.
Note that if X 6= Y , then AX \ AY or AY \ AX is dense. Let KA and KB
be as in Example 7 and MA is as in Example 3. If A \ B is dense, then
KA 6= KB, as MA ∈ KB but MA /∈ KA. Thus the classes KAX , X ⊆ 2
ω,
are all different. For cardinality reasons there is X ⊆ 2ω so that KAX is not
definable in Σ11,δ, nor in Lω1ω1 . But KAX is always definable in L
d
AX
. ✷
The following result merely improves the previous result:
Theorem 15 There is a countable A0 ⊆ 2ω such that if A0 ⊆ A ⊆ 2ω with
2ω \ A dense, then QA is not Σ
1
1-definable.
Proof: Let us consider MB, where B = 2ω (defined in Example 3).
Let M be resplendent such that MB ≺ M. Let M+ be an expansion of
M such that every Σ11-sentence true in M
+ has a witness in the vocabulary
(countable). Let N+ ≺ M+ be countable. Let A0 be the countable set
Ω(N+). Suppose now A0 ⊆ A ⊆ 2ω, but ψA, as defined in Example 7,
is definable by a Σ11-sentence φ. Since 2
ω \ A dense, MB |= ψA, whence
MB |= φ. Hence all the first order consequences of φ are true in MB.
Since M is resplendent, M |= φ. Since φ has a witness in M+, N+ |= φ.
Hence N+ |= ψA whence Ω(N+) \ A is dense. This is a contradiction, as
Ω(N+) \ A = ∅. ✷
Theorem 16 Let P be the poset of finite partial functions (ω1+ω1)×ω → 2
i.e. the forcing for adding ω1 + ω1 Cohen reals. Let G be P-generic and
ηα ∈ 2ω, α < ω1 + ω1, the Cohen reals added by G. Let A be the set of η
such that η = ηα (mod finite) for some α < ω1. Then in V [G], QA is not
Σ11-definable.
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Proof: Let B be the set of η such that η = ηα(mod finite) for some
α < ω1+ω1. ThenMB |= ψA. Suppose φ is a Σ11-sentence logically equivalent
to ψA. Thus MB |= φ. Let f be a bijection (in V ) of ω1 + ω1 onto ω1. The
function f induces an complete embedding f¯ of P into P. The mapping f¯
induces a mapping τ 7→ τf¯ between P-terms. Let N be the image of MB
under this mapping. Now N |= φ, whence N |= ψA, a contradiction. ✷
Theorem 17 Assume A = 2ω \D, where D ⊆ 2ω is dense, ω < |D| < 2ℵ0
and there is an open set U such that D∩V is uncountable for every non-empty
open V ⊆ U . Then the quantifier QA is not Σ11-definable.
Proof: Recall that ψA is a sentence of L
d
A in the vocabulary τd saying
that Ω(M) \ A is dense. Thus ψA says Ω(M) ∩ D is dense. Let φ be a Σ11
sentence ∃Rφ0 such that ψA and φ are logically equivalent, contradicting our
desired conclusion. Let 〈Dα : α < ω1〉 be a sequence of disjoint countable
dense subsets of D ∩ U . Let Nα be a countable model representing the set
Dα, whence it satisfies ψA, hence φ, and there is an expansion N
∗
α of Nα
to a model of φ0. Let N = 〈N∗α : α < ω1〉. Let B = (H(χ),∈, <), for a
large enough χ and for a well-ordering < of H(χ). We choose a countable
elementary submodel B∗ of B such that {N , A, ω1} ⊂ B
∗.
By Theorem IV.5.19 of [9] there is a sequence 〈Bα : α < ω2〉 of countable
elementary extensions of B∗ such that for every α < β < 2ω:
(a) Bα has standard ω.
(b) Bα has a (possibly non-standard) member cα of (ω1)
B∗ .
(c) If an element of ω2 is definable in both Bα and Bβ, then it is in B
∗.
Let N+η be the cη’th member of the sequence 〈N
∗
α : α < ω1〉 as interpreted
in Bη. So necessarily N
+
η is a model of φ0 and hence its reduct N
+
η ↾ τd is
a model of φ, and further of ψA. We have continuum many models N
+
η ↾ τd
of ψA. However, we will now show that the number of η for which the
model N+η ↾ τd satisfies ψA is at most |D| < 2
ω, a contradiction. Suppose
N+η ↾ τd |= ψA. Then the subset of 2
ω represented by N+η = (N
∗
cη
)Bη , i.e.
(Dcη)
Bη , meets D in a dense set. Every element of (Dcη)
Bη is definable in
Bη. By the disjointness clause (c) above we get the claimed contradiction.
We now finish the proof of Theorem 17: Suppose η is such that N+η 6|= ψA.
This is a contradiction because N+η |= φ. ✷
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7 No strongest extension
We show that there is no strongest extension among positive logics of first
order logic, or Σ11, or Σ
1
1,δ, with the Compactness Theorem and the Downward
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem.
We consider sequences A = 〈Aα : α ≤ ω1〉 such that each Aα, α < ω1, is
a countable dense subset of 2ω, α < β implies Aα ⊂ Aβ , Aω1 =
⋃
α<ω1
Aα,
and the set S = {α < ω1 : Aα =
⋃
β<αAβ} is stationary.
Let ΘTL be the first order sentence
∃x(R3(x) ∧ ∀y(¬R4(y) ∨ R2(x, y)))∧
∀x∀y(¬R0(x, y) ∨R2(x, y))∧
∀x∀y(¬R1(x, y) ∨R2(x, y))∧
∀x∀y(¬R2(x, y) ∨ (R4(x) ∧R4(y)))∧
∀x(¬R4(x) ∨R2(x, x))∧
∀x∀y∀z(¬R2(x, y) ∨ ¬R2(y, z) ∨ R2(x, z))∧
∀x∀y∀z(¬R2(y, x) ∨ ¬R2(z, x) ∨R2(y, z) ∨ R2(z, y)).
Intuitively, ΘTL says that R2 is a tree-like partial order extending R0 and R1.
For example, the modelMA of Example 3 always satisfies ΘTL. IfM |= ΘTL,
then one element a of M can represent only one η, i.e.
η, η′ ∈ Ω(M, a) implies η = η′. (5)
Definition 18 We define the Lindstro¨m quantifier QA as follows. Suppose
M is a model and c¯ ∈ Mk. Then we define that M satisfies
(QAx0x1)(ψ0(x0, x1, c¯), ψ1(x0, x1, c¯), ψ2(x0, x1, c¯), ψ3(x0, c¯), ψ4(x0, c¯)) (6)
if and only if Mψ¯ |= ΘTL and Ω(Mψ¯) ∩ Aω1 ∈ A, where Mψ¯ is as in
Definition 5 and Ω(Mψ¯) is as in Definition 4.
Definition 19 We define LdA as the closure of first order logic under ∧,∨, ∃,
∀, ∃R and QA. The fragment, where QA is applied to first order formulas ψ¯
only is denoted Ld
−
A . Similarly, L
d,ω
A , L
d,∞
A , L
d−,ω
A , and L
d−,∞
A .
Theorem 20 ( Los´ Lemma for LdA) SupposeMi, i ∈ I, are models and D
is an ω1-incomplete ultrafilter on a set I. LetM =
∏
i∈IMi/D, f0, . . . , fn−1 ∈∏
i∈IMi and φ(x0, . . . , xn−1) in L
d
A (even in L
d,∞
A ). Then
{i ∈ I :Mi |= φ(f0(i), . . . , fn−1(i))} ∈ D ⇒M |= φ(f0/D, . . . , fn−1/D).
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Proof: We follow the proof of Theorem 8. The only point that requires
attention is the induction step for QA. We assume
J = {u ∈ I :Mi |= QAx0x1ψ0(x0, x1, f¯(i)) . . . ψ4(x0, f¯(i))} ∈ D (7)
and demonstrate M |= QAx0x1ψ0(x0, x1, f¯/D) . . . ψ4(x0, f¯/D). As in the
proof of Theorem 8, it can be shown that the set B of η ∈ 2ω such that
there is a ∈ M such that for some bn0 , . . . , b
n
n−1 in
∏
iMi/D we have M |=
Γn,k
ψ¯,η↾n
(bn0 , . . . , b
n
n−1, a, f¯/D) for all n < ω, is the full set 2
ω. It follows that
2ω ∩ Aω1 = Aω1 and hence that 2
ω ∩ Aω1 ∈ A, as claimed. ✷
Corollary 21 If 2ω \ A is dense, then LdA (even L
d,∞
A ) satisfies the (full)
Compactness Theorem.
Proof: The ultrafilter we used in the proof of Corollary 9 was regular,
hence ω1-incomplete. ✷
We can prove the Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem for Ld
−
A
only (see Proposition 25 and Theorem 27).
Theorem 22 (Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem) Sup-
poseM is a model for a countable vocabulary and X ⊆M is countable. Then
there is N 4−
Ld
−
A
M (even N 4−Γ M for any fixed countable fragment of L
d,ω
A )
such that X ⊆ N and |N | ≤ ℵ0.
Proof: We first expand M as follows: For every Ld
−
A -formula φ(R, z¯),
where R is n-ary and z¯ = z0, . . . , zk−1, there is a predicate symbol R
∗ of arity
k+n such that ifM |= ∃Rφ(R, c¯), thenM |= φ(R∗(c¯, ·), c¯). Likewise, we may
assume the vocabulary ofM has a Skolem function fφ for each formula φ(x, z¯)
such that if M |= ∃φ(x, c¯), then M |= φ(fφ(c¯), c¯). Let τ be the original
vocabulary of M and τ ∗ the vocabulary of the expansion, which we also
denote M. For any formulas ψ¯ in Ld−A of the vocabulary τ
∗ let g(n, k, ψ¯, η)
be the function which maps n, k, ψ¯ and η ∈ 2n to Γn,k
ψ¯,η
(y0, . . . , yn, x, z¯). Recall
that S = {α < ω1 : Aα =
⋃
β<αAβ} is stationary. Let K ≺ Hθ, where
θ ≥ (2ω)+ such thatM ⊆ Hθ, |K| = ℵ0, {A, ω1, τ ∗,M, X, g}∪ω1∪τ∪X ⊆ K,
and δ = K∩ω1 ∈ S. Let N be the restriction ofM to K, i.e. the universe N
ofN isM∩K and the constants, relations and functions ofM are relativized
to N .
As in the proof of Theorem 12, N is closed under the interpretations of
function symbols of the vocabulary of M.
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Claim: If φ(~x) is a τ ∗-formula in Ld
−
A , then M |= φ(~c)⇒ N |= φ(~c).
We use induction on φ. In light of the proof of Theorem 12, we only need
to consider the quantifier QA. Suppose M satisfies (6) with c¯ ∈ Nk. Thus
Ω(Mψ¯) ∩Aω1 ∈ A. Hence
K |= “Ω(Mψ¯) ∩ Aω1 ∈ A”.
Note that since δ ∈ S, K ∩ Aω1 = Aδ.
Case 1: Ω(Mψ¯) ∩ Aω1 = Aα for some α < ω1. Then α < δ and
K |= “Ω(Mψ¯) ∩Aω1 = Aα”.
We prove Ω(Nψ¯) ∩ Aω1 = Aα, from which Ω(Nψ¯) ∩ Aω1 ∈ A follows.
Let first η ∈ Ω(Nψ¯) ∩ Aω1 . There are a ∈ N and b
n
0 , . . . , b
n
n−1 in N
such that N |= Γn,k
ψ¯,η↾n
(bn0 , . . . , b
n
n−1, a, c¯) for all n < ω. Since the formulas
of ψ¯ are first order, M |= Γn,k
ψ¯,η↾n
(bn0 , . . . , b
n
n−1, a, c¯) for all n < ω. Hence
η ∈ Ω(Mψ¯) ∩ Aω1 = Aα.
For the converse, let η ∈ Aα. Note that now η ∈ K. By the choice
of α, η ∈ Ω(Mψ¯). Hence there is a ∈ M such that for some b
n
0 , . . . , b
n
n−1
in M we have M |= Γn,k
ψ¯,η↾n
(bn0 , . . . , b
n
n−1, a, c¯) for all n < ω. Such an a and
such bn0 , . . . , b
n
n−1 exist also in K, by elementarity, as η ∈ K. By Induction
Hypothesis, N |= Γn,k
ψ¯,η↾n
(bn0 , . . . , b
n
n−1, a, c¯) for all n < ω. Thus η ∈ Ω(Nψ¯).
Case 2: Ω(Mψ¯) ∩ Aω1 = Aω1 . Then K |= “Ω(Mψ¯) ∩ Aω1 = Aδ”. We prove
Ω(Nψ¯) ∩Aω1 = Aδ, from which Ω(Nψ¯) ∩ Aω1 ∈ A follows.
Let first η ∈ Ω(Nψ¯) ∩ Aω1 . As in Case 1, η ∈ Ω(Mψ¯). Because we have
(5), that is, η is determined by an element of N , we may conclude η ∈ K.
By K ≺ Hθ, η ∈ (Aω1)
K . Hence η ∈ Aδ.
For the converse, let η ∈ Aδ. Since δ ∈ S, Aδ ⊂ K, and hence η ∈ K. On
the other hand, η ∈ Ω(Mψ¯), since Aδ ⊂ Aω1 = Ω(Mψ¯) ∩ Aω1 . Now we can
argue as in Case 1 to conclude η ∈ Ω(Nψ¯). ✷
A consequence of Corollary 20 and Theorem 22 is that the positive logic
Ld
−
A is an extension of Σ
1
1 with both the Compactness Theorem and the Down-
ward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem. Similarly, Ld
−,ω
A is such an extension of
Σ11,δ.
Theorem 23 There are positive logics L1 and L2 such that
1. L1, L2 both (properly) extend Σ
1
1.
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2. L1, L2 both satisfy the Compactness Theorem and the Downward Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem Theorem.
3. There is no logic L3 such that L1 ≤ L3, L2 ≤ L3, and L3 satisfies the
Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem.
We can replace Σ11 by Σ
1
1,δ.
Proof: Let A be as above but Aα =
⋃
β<αAβ for all limit α. Let
S, S ′ ⊆ ω1 be disjoint stationary sets. Note that the set of elements of S that
are limits of elements of S is stationary, because it contains the intersection
of S with the closed unbounded set of limits of elements of S. Similarly,
the set of elements of S ′ that are limits of elements of S ′ is stationary. Let
A = 〈Aα : α ∈ S〉 ⌢ 〈Aω1〉 and A
′ = 〈Aα : α ∈ S ′〉 ⌢ 〈Aω1〉. Now both
{α ∈ S : Aα =
⋃
β∈α∩S Aβ} and {α ∈ S
′ : Aα =
⋃
β∈α∩S′ Aβ} are stationary.
Let
ψA = (QAx0x1)(R0(x0, x1), R1(x0, x1), R2(x0, x1), R3(x0), R4(x0))
and similarly ψA′ . Let φ be the sentence ψA ∧ ψA′ ∧ ΘTL. This sentence
has a model, namely MAω1 . Suppose it has a countable model N . Then
Ω(N ) ∩ Aω1 ∈ A ∩ A
′. Hence Ω(N ) ∩ Aω1 = Aω1. Since N |= ΘTL, N must
be uncountable, a contradiction. ✷
Corollary 24 No extension of Σ11 is strongest with respect to the Compact-
ness Theorem and the Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem, among posi-
tive logics.
We shall now prove that Theorem 22 does not hold with Ld−A replaced by
LdA.
Proposition 25 Suppose A is as above. There is an uncountable model M
for a countable vocabulary such that there is no countable N 4−
Ld
A
M.
Proof: Let M be the union of 2ω, 2<ω and 2ω × ω1. The relations of
the structure M are
1. RMi = {aˆ〈i〉 : a ∈ 2
<ω} (i = 0, 1).
2. RM2 = {(a, b) ∈ (2
<ω)× 2ω : a ⊳ b}.
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3. RM3 = {∅}.
4. RM4 = 2
ω ∪ 2<ω.
5. RM5 = {(a, (a, α)) : a ∈ 2
ω, α < ω1}.
6. RM6 = 2
ω.
7. RM7 = 2
<ω.
8. QM1 = 2
ω × ω1.
9. QM2 = {(a, α) ∈ Q1 : (a ∈ A0 ∧ α < ω) ∨ (a ∈ A2 \ A1 ∧ α < ω1)}.
10. QM3 = {(a, b) : ∃α(a ∈ Aα ∧ b ∈ Aω1 \ Aα)}.
Suppose N 4−
Ld
A
M is countable. Let φ(x) be the existential second order
formula
R6(x) ∧ ∃F (F is a one-one function from R7 onto {y : Q2(x, y)}).
• M |= φ(a) if and only if a ∈ AM0 .
• N |= φ(a) if and only if a ∈ AN0 ∪ (A
N
2 \ A
N
1 ).
Thus
M |= (QAx0x1)(ψ0(x0, x1, c¯), ψ1(x0, x1, c¯), ψ2(x0, x1, c¯), ψ3(x0, c¯), ψ4(x0, c¯))
but
N 6|= (QAx0x1)(ψ0(x0, x1, c¯), ψ1(x0, x1, c¯), ψ2(x0, x1, c¯), ψ3(x0, c¯), ψ4(x0, c¯))
✷
Despite the negative result of Theorem 25, Theorem 22 still holds for the
fragment of LdA obtained by dropping existential second order quantifiers.
Definition 26 Let Ld0A be defined as L
d
A (Definition 19) except that exis-
tential second order quantification is not allowed. Let Ld1A be defined as the
extension of LdA by adding negation to the logical operations.
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Clearly, Ld0A is a positive logic and it satisfies the Compactness Theorem
because even LdA does. The logic L
d1
A is an abstract logic in the sense of [7].
Unlike our positive logics, it is closed under negation and also closed under
substitution. Note that Ld0A ≤ L
d1
A .
Theorem 27 (Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem) Sup-
pose M is a model for a countable vocabulary and X ⊆ M is countable.
Then there is N 4Ld1
A
M such that X ⊆ N and |N | ≤ ℵ0. In particular,
N 4Ld0
A
M.
Proof: This is as in the proof of Theorem 22. We first expand M
as follows: For every Ld1A -formula φ(z¯), where z¯ = z0, . . . , zk−1, there is a
predicate symbol Rφ of arity k such that M |= ∀z¯(φ(z¯)↔ Rφ(z¯)). Let τ be
the original vocabulary of M and τ ∗ the vocabulary of the expansion. For
any atomic formulas ψ¯ of the vocabulary τ ∗ let g(n, k, ψ¯, η) be the function
which maps n, k, ψ¯ and η ∈ 2n to Γn,k
ψ¯,η
(y0, . . . , yn, x, z¯). Let K ≺ Hθ, where
θ ≥ (2ω)+ such thatM ⊆ Hθ, |K| = ℵ0, {A, ω1, τ ∗,M, X, g}∪ω1∪τ∪X ⊆ K,
and δ = K∩ω1 ∈ S. Let N be the restriction ofM to K, i.e. the universe N
ofN isM∩K and the constants, relations and functions ofM are relativized
to N .
As in the proof of Theorem 12, N is closed under the interpretations of
function symbols of the vocabulary of M.
Claim: If φ(~x) is a τ ∗-formula in Ld1A and ~c ∈ N , then N |= φ(~c)↔ Rφ(~c).
The proof of this claim is as in the proof of Theorem 22. Since N ⊆M
in the vocabulary τ ∗, the claim implies N 4Ld1
A
M. ✷
The logic Ld1A is closed under negation and satisfies the Downward Lo¨wen-
heim-Skolem Theorem. Thus it cannot satisfy the Compactness Theorem,
although its sublogic Ld0A does.
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